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Introduction
Financial reform can be defined as measures aiming at the removal of noncompetitive market forces in the financial sector, thereby increasing its level of liberalization. Consequently, financial reform improves financial sector development, which, in turn, may enhance economic growth. At the same time, there is some evidence that increasing liberalization induces risk-taking behavior and may cause banking crises (cf. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 2000) . However, previous studies did not consider the conditioning impact of supervisory control or the overall level of financial liberalization in analyzing the impact of reform on the likelihood of crises. Moreover, the financial liberalization data used in these studies was quite limited and rather subjective. We employ a better methodology and an extensive new data set of financial reform recently provided by Abiad et al. (2008) to examine the impact of financial reform on banking crises. Our findings suggest that certain dimensions of financial reform reduce the likelihood of systemic banking crises-defined as crises in which much or all bank capital has been exhausted-conditional on adequate banking supervision. This result is broadly in line with the finding of Beck et al. (2006) that the presence of regulatory policies and institutions that discourage competition are associated with greater banking system fragility. We also find that once a country has reformed, the introduction of further reforms becomes easier and leads to more stable financial systems. This implies that there is a "learning effect" which has also been pointed out by Abiad and Mody (2005) in a different context. Moreover, we find some evidence that the likelihood of non-systemic crises-defined as crises limited to a small number of banks-increases after financial reform enhancing liberalization. These results therefore suggest that increased competition due to the financial reform may lead to the elimination of some inefficient financial institutions.
We analyze the impact of financial reform on systemic and non-systemic banking crises in 85 countries during the period 1973 to 2002. Our data on banking crises come from Honahan and Laeven (2005) . Our indicator of financial form is based on the data set of Abiad et al. (2008) indicating the extent to which a financial system is liberalized.
2 This is an extended and updated version of the database as used by Abiad and Mody (2005) , covering various dimensions of the financial system. The measures relate to the presence of (i) credit controls and reserve requirements, (ii) interest rate controls, (iii) entry barriers, (iv) state ownership in the banking sector, (v) capital account restrictions, (vi) prudential regulation and supervision of the banking sector, and (vii) securities market policy.
We address the following research questions: (1) does financial reform, conditional on supervisory control, affect the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis, and if so, are there differences among the various dimensions of financial reform that we distinguish? (2) Does the impact of financial reform on banking crises vary at different levels of liberalization of the financial system? and (3) Are systemic and non-systemic crises affected in the same way by financial reform leading to more liberalization?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion on the determinants of banking crises and a brief literature review. It also introduces our measures for financial reform and banking crises. Section 3 describes the specification of our model and explains other explanatory variables used in our analysis. Section 4 analyses the impact of financial reform on the likelihood of systemic crises. Section 5 examines whether the impact of financial reform is conditioned by the level of liberalization. Section 6 deals with the impact of financial liberalization on non-systemic crises. Finally, section 7 offers a discussion of our results and their policy implications.
Financial reform and banking crisis

Previous studies
Demirgüç- Kunt and Detragiache (1998) analyze the relationship between banking crises and policies aimed at increasing financial liberalization using data over the period 1980-95 for 53 countries. Their findings suggest that banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial systems. They also find that the impact of financial liberalization on a fragile banking sector is weaker where the institutional environment is strong. The indicator of financial reform used by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) is a dummy variable taking a value of one for the first year in which some interest rates were liberalized. Although interest rate liberalization is important, it only covers a minor part of financial sector reform. Furthermore, this indicator does account for policy reversals.
Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) examine how absence of corruption ('transparency') affects the probability of a financial crisis. Using multivariate probit modeling for 56 countries during 1977-97, they report a higher probability of a crisis following financial reform during the following five years. Moreover, they find that the crisis probability is higher in countries with poor transparency than in countries that are transparent. Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) provide their own dating of financial reform and construct their reform measure on the basis of these dates.
Focusing on the link between currency and banking crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) analyze 76 currency crises and 26 banking crises for 20 countries during 1970 to mid-1995. One of their main findings is that financial reform enhancing liberalization often precedes banking crises. Their proxy for increased financial liberalization is two-year lagged domestic credit growth. Again, this is a poor proxy as increased credit growth may also be caused by various other factors than financial reform and it does not capture the diversity of financial reform.
On the basis of a panel analysis, Caprio and Martinez (2000) find that government ownership of banks increases the likelihood of banking crisis.
However, Barth et al. (2004) using cross-country analysis, do not find that government ownership is significantly associated with increases in bank fragility once they control for the regulatory and supervisory environment.
There are also various papers that do not explicitly include policies aiming at financial liberalization as a potential determinant of banking crises. A good example is the recent study by Beck et al. (2006) who examine the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood that a country experiences a systemic banking crisis. They use data from 1980 to 1997 for 69 countries and report that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems. Moreover, they find that regulatory policies and institutions that discourage competition are associated with greater banking system fragility.
Data
The studies discussed above use different indicators of banking crises. index, to be discussed hereafter, and the availability of control variables. Table A1 in the Appendix identifies the years in which the countries in our sample had a crisis.
Our data on financial liberalization come from Abiad et al. (2008) who distinguish seven dimensions of the extent to which the financial sector has been liberalized that are graded on scale from 3 (fully liberalized) to 0 (not liberalized).
Apart from distinguishing between different dimensions of financial liberalization on an annual basis, the database has the advantage that it allows for policy reversals. The first dimension of liberalization refers to credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements (referred to as credit controls henceforth)
focusing on the presence of specific credit ceilings or floors, and reserve requirements. The second dimension is about interest rate controls examining We take the change of the various liberalization measures as our indicators of financial reform. by Laeven and Valencia (2008) as it does not distinguish between systemic and non-systemic crises, while the duration of the crises is also not available. 
Model specification
To analyze the impact of financial liberalization on systemic and non-systemic banking crises, we estimate the following model:
The dependent variable
Crisis takes a value of 1 if there is a banking crisis and zero if there is no crisis. In section 4 the dependent variable refers to systemic crisis, while in section 6 the dependent variable refers to non-systemic crisis. 4 The 4 Following previous studies, we assume that banking crises do not lead to a new regime so that the model does not suffer from the Lucas critique. However, during a banking crisis the impact of the 
The key hypothesis to test for the marginal effect of financial reform on the probability of a crisis, conditional on supervisory control, is:
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right-hand side variables may be different than during normal times. We will address this issue later in the paper. 
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If Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution and
denotes all explanatory variables in equation (3), the conditional mean of the crisis variable can be written as:
The key hypothesis to test for the marginal effect of financial reform on the probability of a crisis, conditional on different levels of liberalization, can be derived from equation (4) as: Table 1 summarizes the control variables and Table A3 in the appendix gives a list of our dependent and independent variables 6 and also provides their sources and expected signs. 
Financial liberalization and systemic banking crisis
Main results
For the analysis of our first research question, i.e., what is the impact of financial liberalization on systemic banking crises conditional on supervisory control, we estimate equation (1) using a probit model with random effects. 7 Table 2 In column (1), we regress systemic banking crises on control variables only, without using any financial reform measure or interactions. Our findings are in line with those of previous studies and the estimated coefficients are in accordance with the expected signs as shown in Table A2 . Real GDP growth, initial GDP/capita, real interest rate, the initial level of liberalization, and depreciation turn out to be significant.
In column (2), we introduce our indicator of overall financial reform. It turns out that the interaction term of overall financial reform with supervision appears significant and has a negative sign. Economically, the effect is modest but still it clearly has a negative impact on the likelihood of systemic crises and in our later tests this effect remains quite robust.
In the remaining columns of Table 2 we include the various dimensions of financial reform separately one by one. We observe that the interaction terms of 7 We cannot use conditional logit or fixed effect models, because initial GDP per capita and initial level of liberalization are time-invariant variables. Furthermore, these techniques drop those countries that did not face any crisis during the sample period. Arellano and Hahn (2007) and Green (2004) show that the probit estimator is also not well behaved in the presence of fixed effects.
supervision and reforms come up significant except for barriers to entry and securities market reforms. Moreover, all these interaction effects have negative signs.
However, as mentioned before, inference based on the coefficient of financial reform or the interaction term only is insufficient and can lead to deceptive findings. 8 ) i t Crisis is the estimated probability of a crisis in country i at time t. A perfect forecast will result in a Brier score of 0. A forecast that is always wrong will yield a Brier Score of 1, while a forecast that is correct in 50 percent will result in a Brier Score of 0.25. The Brier Score of our models is around 0.14, which indicates that our model is performing well.
8 A similar logic applies to supervisory control and its interaction terms.
Endogeneity
Even though we follow Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000) and examine the impact of reform measures taken over period prior to a crisis, the results presented in section 4.1 may suffer from an endogeneity problem, because supervisors may liberalize or reverse the liberalization of their financial systems in the wake of a crisis. We test for this problem using a two-step probit model with endogenous regressors. Secondly, we use the openness of the economy (computed as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) as an instrument. We average both instruments over five years.
We check the validity of our instruments by the Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum chi-square test under the null hypothesis that the used group of instruments is valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation. As shown in the bottom panel of Table A5 in the appendix, we cannot reject the null hypothesis indicating that our set of instrument is valid. Next, we apply the Wald test of exogeneity under the null hypothesis that the instrumented variable is exogenous. The results as shown in Table A5 suggest that none of the reform measures appears endogenous.
An alternative check on endogeneity was performed, dropping all the observations after the start of a crisis (keeping the first year only) until the end of the crisis and re-estimating the models shown in *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level and * indicates significance at 10 percent level of significance.
Figure 2. Effect of financial reform on systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control
This figure shows the marginal effect of different kinds of financial reform on the likelihood of systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control. It corresponds to our results in Table 2 . The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform, while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. LR refers to overall reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization reform, while CapR refers to capital control reform, and SR refers to securities market reform. Table 3 . The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform, while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. LR refers to overall reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization reform, CapR refers to capital control reform, and SR refers to securities market reform. Table 4 . The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform, while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. LR refers to overall reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization reform, while CapR refers to capital control reform, and SR refers to securities market reform. 
Robustness
We examine the robustness of our results presented in section 4.1 in a number of ways. These tests indicate that our results are not sensitive to changes in our sample and model specification.
Firstly, we restrict our sample to non-OECD countries. It reduces our number of observations from 1459 country-year observations for 85 countries to 944 country-year observations for 61 countries. The results are presented in Table   A6 in the Appendix, while the corresponding tests of the hypotheses are shown in Figure A1 in the Appendix. The interaction effect of liberalization remains significant and negative, while the tests of the hypotheses are similar to those reported in Figure 2 . The only change is that the interaction of privatization and supervisory control does not appear significant, but the corresponding hypothesis test does not change. The main estimation results of equation (3) are presented in Table 3 and the graphical presentation of the testing of the hypotheses is shown in Figure 3 . As shown in Table 3 , the interaction effects of the level of liberalization with financial reforms appear significant with a negative sign. The overall models appear significant at 1 percent level of significance and the Brier Scores also indicate that the models are performing well.
The top-left graph in Figure 3 presents the impact of reform at different levels of liberalization. A first thing to note is that the effect of reforms on the likelihood of a crisis appears negative after a certain minimum level of liberalization has been reached. As financial systems become more liberalized, the negative impact on the likelihood of systemic crises of further financial reforms becomes significant. This suggests that financial systems learn from the process of liberalization and leads to less fragility in the long run.
The same result holds for various dimensions of reform. Removal of credit controls, interest rate controls, privatization, and capital account reform all contribute to a more stable banking sector.
Are non-systemic crises different?
With the introduction of more competition and transparency in the financial system through market-based reforms, it is very much likely that some inefficient banks are forced to close. Therefore, it seems likely that financial reform will have a different impact on non-systemic crises than on systemic crises. So far, most previous studies do not treat systemic and non-systemic crises differently. We are not aware of studies examining the impact of financial reform on non-systemic crises, even though the effect of financial reform on non-systemic crises is likely to differ from that on systemic crises. Modeling non-systemic crises is a difficult task for two reasons. First, there are many factors that can cause non-systemic crises depending on the heterogeneous specializations and ownership structures of banks 11 , and second, it is not necessary that these crises occur because of changes in macroeconomic or financial system variables. Still, we check whether financial reform affects the likelihood of non-systemic crises, thereby addressing our third research question. We estimate equation (1) using a panel probit model with nonsystemic crises as the dependent variable.
The results are shown in Table 4 
Conclusions and policy implications
We have examined the effect of (six dimensions of) financial reform on the likelihood of systemic and non-systemic banking crises. We find that reform that enhances liberalization reduces the likelihood of systemic crises, subject to appropriate supervisory control. Furthermore, financial systems learn from reform, which helps introducing further reforms without adverse outcomes. Moreover, we find that systemic and non-systemic crises are driven by different factors.
Our findings suggest the need to reconsider a widely shared view that has emerged in the wake of the current financial crisis, namely that strict regulation is needed for financial stability. Our results indicate that financial reform conditional on good supervisory control reduces the likelihood of systemic crises, and it therefore important to combine both policies in a meaningful way. In contrast, nowadays many observers seem to believe that reforms that have liberalized financial systems have played an important role in creating the current financial crises. Consequently, there may be a reversal of some of these liberalization measures in the wake of the crisis. However, as pointed out by Allen and Gale (2007) , the extensive financial regulation introduced after the Great Depression not only led to the virtual disappearance of crises, it also seriously affected the efficiency of the financial system. Allen and Gale (2007) argue that the complete elimination of crises is neither optimal nor desirable, because it reduces the ability of financial institutions to perform their basic task of efficient allocation of resources. Excessive regulation reduces the incentives for banks to introduce new services and products. In view of the dynamic requirements of economies, the inability to introduce new products can result in sub-optimal risk hedging and exploitation of consumers. There is a possibility that history may repeat itself. Our results suggest that banking supervision needs to be improved but that the process of financial liberalization should not be reversed.
A potential danger highlighted by our results is the inadequate supervisory control in non-OECD economies. Financial reform in non-OECD countries has narrowed the liberalization gap with high-income OECD countries, but as far as supervision is concerned this gap has widened.
Our results also suggest that financial systems learn from reform, helping to create more stable banking systems. A reversal of liberalization will therefore also indirectly lead to more banking instability. Figure A1 . Effect of financial reform on systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory control (non-high income OECD countries)
The figure shows the marginal effect of different kinds of financial reform on the likelihood of systemic banking crises at different levels of supervisory controls for non high-income OECD countries. It corresponds to our results in Table A6 . The middle line shows the marginal effect of a particular dimension of reform while the upper and lower lines indicate the upper and lower 95 percent confidence intervals. LR refers to overall reform, CR refers to credit control reform, IR refers to interest rate control reform, BR refers to banking entry reform, PR refers to privatization reform, CapR refers to capital control reform, and SR refers to securities market reform. Supervisory Control
